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GIMME SHELTER': DOES THE FAIR HOUSING
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988 REQUIRE ACCOMMODATIONS
FOR THE FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
DISABLED?
INTRODUCTION
In 1968, "Congress enacted what is popularly called the Fair
Housing Act as title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. "2 The
purpose of this portion of the Civil Rights Act was to end discrimi-
natory housing practices across the United States.3 It undertook
this endeavor by making it illegal to discriminate, in housing
contexts, on the basis "of race, color, religion, or national origin."4
In 1974, Congress amended the Fair Housing Act to prohibit gender
discrimination in housing contexts.5 When Congress enacted this
amendment, however, the Fair Housing Act still did not prohibit
discrimination against the disabled.
Twenty years after Congress passed the Fair Housing Act of
1968, it determined that two additional groups needed protection
from discrimination in housing contexts-the disabled6 and families
1. THE ROLLING STONES, Gimme Shelter, on LET IT BLEED (Abkco Records 1969).
2. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 15 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2176.
3. See id.
4. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 3604, 82 Stat. 73, 83 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2003)).
5. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 90-383, sec. 808,
§ 804, 88 Stat. 633, 729 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000)).
6. Some statutes, including the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA), use the
term "handicapped" rather than the term "disabled.' See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (2000) ("[Ilt
shall be unlawful ... [tlo represent to any person because of... handicap ... that any dwelling
is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.").
This Note, however, uses the term "disabled," as it is the term that disabled persons
generally prefer. See Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act: How Much Must One Do Before Hardship Turns Undue?,
59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1311, 1314 n.10 (1991).
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with children.7 Congress enacted the Fair Housing Amendments
Act of 1988 to stop discrimination against these two groups.8
Specifically, to end discrimination against the disabled, Congress
made it unlawful "[tlo discriminate in the sale or rental, or to
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or
renter because of a handicap."9 The FHAA further stated that
discrimination against the disabled included "a refusal to make
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services,
when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a disabled
person an] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling."10
Courts have frequently debated what Congress meant by the
term "reasonable accommodations." It is generally agreed that
Congress originally intended that the scope of reasonable accommo-
dations, under the FHAA, be the same as that for reasonable
accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." Beyond this
agreement, however, courts have often struggled with the meaning
of the term and have, on occasion, come to differing conclusions as
to whether certain actions are reasonable accommodations within
the meaning of the FHAA. 12
7. See H.R. REP. No. 100-771, at 18-19, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179-80
(stating that both the disabled and families with children under the age of eighteen were
discriminated against in housing contexts).
8. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619. This
Note concerns itself only with the provisions of the FHAA that prevent discrimination
against the disabled.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (2000).
10. Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
11. See, e.g., Giebeler v. M&B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The
House Committee Report on the FHAA does state, however, that the interpretations of
'reasonable accommodation' in Rehabilitation Act ... regulations and case law should be
applied to the FHAA's reasonable accommodation provision."); Shapiro v. Cadman Towers,
Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1995) ("We believe that in enacting the anti-discrimination
provisions of the FHAA, Congress relied on the standard of reasonable accommodation
developed under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794.").
12. Compare, e.g., Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, 124 F.3d 597 (4th Cir. 1997)
(allowing a group home to expand from eight to fifteen residents, in violation of the county's
zoning ordinance, was not a reasonable accommodation under the FHAA), with ReMed
Recovery Care Ctrs. v. Township of Willistown, 36 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (allowing
eight people to live in a group home, in violation of a zoning ordinance, was a reasonable
accommodation within the meaning of the FHAA).
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One of the current issues concerning the meaning of the term
reasonable accommodations is whether the FHAA requires
landlords to accommodate for the financial circumstances of
potential tenants who do not have an ability to earn sufficient
incomes because of their disabilities. Some courts have found
that landlords do not need to make accommodations in these
situations, 3 whereas at least one court has found that accommodat-
ing for these circumstances is a reasonable accommodation within
the meaning of the FHAA. 4
This Note addresses the issue of whether a landlord must
accommodate for the financial circumstances of a potential tenant,
if those financial circumstances are caused by that person's
disability. This issue is examined within the framework of two
important cases, which reached differing conclusions concerning
whether the FHAA requires this type of accommodation. First, in
Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 5 the Second Circuit
decided that, if a landlord has a policy of not accepting Section 8
vouchers from tenants, it is not a reasonable accommodation within
the meaning of the FHAA to require that landlord to accept a
Section 8 voucher from a disabled potential tenant, even if that
potential tenant's need for the voucher is the product of his or
her disability. Five years later, however, in Giebeler v. M&B
Associates, 6 the Ninth Circuit determined that, even if a landlord
has a policy against accepting cosigners, it is a reasonable accom-
modation within the meaning of the FHAA to allow a potential
tenant to utilize a cosigner, as long as his or her need for that
cosigner is the direct result of his or her disability.
This Note presents evidence that the court's decision in Salute
was correct, whereas the court's ruling in Giebeler was improper.
Part I of this Note gives a brief overview of the Section 8 voucher
program. Part II presents a short synopsis of the Salute and
13. See, e.g., Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 299-302 (2d
Cir. 1998); Schanz v. Vill. Apartments, 998 F. Supp. 784, 791-92 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
14. See Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1144-45.
15. 136 F.3d 293.
16. 343 F.3d 1143.
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Giebeler cases. Part III establishes that the reliance in Giebeler on
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett"v is improper, as Barnett does not
support the propositions that the Giebeler court purported it to
support. Part IV then argues that it is unlikely that Congress
intended "reasonable accommodations" to extend to accommoda-
tions for a disabled person's financial circumstances, even if those
circumstances are caused by that person's disability. Finally, Part
V demonstrates that accommodations for financial circumstances
are not "necessary" to provide a disabled person with the "opportu-
nity to use and enjoy a dwelling," which they are entitled to under
the FHAA. 18 For these reasons, this Note concludes that accommo-
dating for a disabled person's financial situation, even if that
situation is caused by that person's disability, is not a reasonable
accommodation within the meaning of the FHAA.
I. THE SECTION 8 VOUCHER PROGRAM
A background knowledge of the Section 8 voucher program is
necessary to fully comprehend the discussions present in this Note.
The Section 8 program "allow [s] very low-income families to choose
and lease or purchase safe, decent, and affordable privately-owned
rental housing."19 "To participate in the Section 8 program, an
eligible family applies to a local" public housing agency.2" The
program applicants are then placed on a list and wait to receive
their voucher.2 Once a voucher has been obtained, the qualified
individual or family then attempts to find an apartment that meets
Section 8 guidelines and that has a landlord who is willing to accept
Section 8 tenants.22 The Section 8 voucher allows its holder to pay
a specified percentage of his or her gross income as rent, while the
government pays the tenant's landlord the remainder of the rent
17. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2000).
19. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Housing Choice Vouchers, at http'J/www.hud.gov/
offices/pih/programs/hcv/index.cfm (last visited Oct., 2004).
20. Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 781 (2d Cir. 1994).
21. See id.
22. Salute v. Stratford Greens Gardens Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 1998).
790 [Vol. 46:787
GIMME SHELTER
that is due.23 "Participation [in the program] by landlords is
voluntary; they lawfully may refuse to accept applications from
Section 8 beneficiaries."24
In a recent study that examined the Section 8 program, only
twenty-two percent of Section 8 "voucher holders [in the study's
sample population] had a disabled family member."25 It can be
inferred from this statistic that most Section 8 voucher holders are
not disabled, nor do they have a disabled family member.26
II. CASE LAw CONCERNING ACCOMMODATIONS FOR FINANCIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER THE FHAA
A. Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments
One of the first cases to address the issue of whether financial
accommodations are required under the FHAA was Salute v.
Stratford Greens Garden Apartments. In Salute, the management
at the Stratford Greens apartment complex in Suffolk County, New
York, denied two potential tenants' applications because they
needed to use Section 8 vouchers to pay portions of their rent.
Richard Salute, one of the potential tenants, suffered from "multi-
ple medical problems, including chronic asthma, dextroscoliosis of
the back, diverticulitis, ulcerative colitis and depression."27 Salute
had found a suitable apartment at Stratford Greens, but was
denied an apartment because of his participation in the Section 8
program.28
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. 1 MERYL FINKEL & LARRY BURON, ABT ASSOCS., STUDY ON SECTION 8 VOUCHER
SuccEss RATES: QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF SUCCESS RATES IN METROPOLITAN AREAS 1-8(2001),
available at http'//www.abtassoc.com/reports/2001871779298_23544.pdf.
26. Evidence that the disabled are not the primary beneficiaries of the Section 8 program
substantially diminishes any argument that failing to require the use of Section 8 vouchers
has a discriminatory disparate impact on the disabled. See infra Part IV.B.
27. Salute v. Stratford Greens, 918 F. Supp. 660,662 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 136 F.3d 293
(2d Cir. 1998).
28. Id.
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Marie Kravette, the other potential tenant that Stratford Greens
denied, suffered from degenerative rheumatoid arthritis and clinical
depression, which prevented her from working.29 Kravette, like
Salute, had applied for an apartment at Stratford Greens, but was
denied because she participated in the Section 8 voucher program.3 °
1. Section 8 Vouchers as Reasonable Accommodations in Salute
At the time Salute and Kravette applied for apartments,
Stratford Greens had a policy of refusing to accept tenants who
participated in the Section 8 program." Because of this policy, the
management at Stratford Greens denied the applications of both
Salute and Kravette.32 Salute and Kravette then sued Stratford
Greens, claiming that it had "violated ... the United States Housing
Act's 'take one, take all' provision"" and had failed to reasonably
accommodate their disabilities by not allowing them to use Section
8 vouchers to pay portions of their rents.34
The Second Circuit determined that accommodations for the
financial circumstances of a potential tenant do not fall within the
FHAA's meaning of reasonable accommodations. It based this
decision upon two principles. First, it determined that, even if the
proposed action was an accommodation within the meaning of the
FHAA, it was unreasonable, which placed it outside the scope of the
FHAA.35 Second, it determined that forcing a landlord to accept a
Section 8 voucher was not an accommodation within the meaning
of the FHAA, even if the need for that voucher came from the
potential tenant's disability.36
29. Salute v. Stratford Greens, 888 F. Supp. 17, 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), summ.j. granted by
918 F. Supp. 660 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998).
30. Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 1998).
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 295. Congress has since repealed this provision. Id. As such, this Note does not
concern itself with any of the claims that either Salute or Kravette may have had under this
law.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 300-01.
36. See id. at 301-02.
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The court first found that, even if allowing the use of a Section 8
voucher were an accommodation within the meaning of the FHAA,
it would be an unreasonable accommodation, and, therefore, not
required. The court believed that the burdens imposed as a result
of participation in the Section 8 program were so substantial that
they "should not be forced on landlords, either as an accommodation
to handicap or otherwise." " The court supported this assertion by
stating that participation in the Section 8 program might expose a
landlord to the unreasonable burdens of "financial audits, mainte-
nance requirements, inspection of the premises, reporting require-
ments, [and] increased risk of litigation."38 The court also expressed
concern that if the government were to end the Section 8 program,
a landlord who had been forced to accept Section 8 tenants would
then face the unreasonable burden of either keeping or dismissing
those tenants who no longer met the financial qualifications
necessary to live in their particular dwellings without program
assistance.39 The court concluded that because of these potential
burdens, an accommodation that required the acceptance of a
Section 8 tenant, even when a landlord had a no Section 8 tenants
policy, created an unreasonable burden and was not required by the
FHAA.
40
The court next determined that accommodations for the financial
circumstances of a tenant were not the type of accommodations
that the FHAA required. Neither Salute nor Kravette requested
accommodations that would alleviate the physical or mental effects
of their disabilities, rather, they requested accommodations for
their financial circumstances. The court concluded that "it is
fundamental that the law adresses the accommodation of handi-
caps, not the alleviation of economic disadvantages that may be
correlated with having handicaps. 41 In other words, the court
decided that to be an accommodation within the meaning of the
37. Id. at 300.
38. Id. at 301.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Id.
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FHAA, the accommodation must alleviate either the direct mental
or physical effects of a person's disability, not just the financial
circumstances that are caused by that disability. Because allowing
Salute and Kravette to use Section 8 vouchers did not alleviate the
physical or mental effects of their respective disabilities, the
requested action was not an accommodation within the meaning of
the FHAA. Specifically, the court stated that:
What stands between these plaintiffs and the apartments at
Stratford Greens is a shortage of money, and nothing else. In
this respect, impecunious people with disabilities stand on the
same footing as everyone else. Thus, the accommodation sought
by plaintiffs is not "necessary" to afford handicapped persons
"equal opportunity" to use and enjoy a dwelling.42
The court also believed that if it had required this type of
accommodation, it would have placed the rights of the disabled
above the rights of the nondisabled.43 The court determined that it
was implausible that Congress intended to create such an inequal-
ity." For these reasons, the Second Circuit affirmed the ruling of
the district court, which stated that an accommodation for the
financial circumstances of a disabled person is not a reasonable
accommodation under the FHAA.
2. Judge Calabresi's Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Calabresi took the position that, in situa-
tions like Salute, allowing a potential tenant to use a Section 8
voucher, even when the landlord has a specific no Section 8 tenant
policy, is a reasonable accommodation within the meaning of the
FHAA. Specifically, Calabresi argued that the majority's assertion
that reasonable accommodations must alleviate the physical or
mental effects of a person's disability was incorrect. Rather, he
contended that, for all reasonable accommodations under the
42. Id. at 302.
43. See id.
44. See id.
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FHAA, it is the need created by the disability, not the disability
itself, that is accommodated.45
For example, Calabresi argued that if the FHAA requires an
apartment complex to make an accommodation that gives a
mobility impaired tenant a parking space that is closer to that
person's apartment, this requirement does not alleviate the actual
physical effect ofbeing mobility impaired but instead accommodates
the need that the disability creates: the need to walk shorter
distances.46 In accordance with this example, Calabresi reasoned
that Salute's and Kravette's disabilities, which prevented them
from working, precipitated the need to supplement their ability to
pay rent by using a Section 8 voucher.47 Calabresi determined that
allowing the use of Section 8 vouchers, despite a landlord's no
voucher policy, would simply accommodate this need.48 Therefore,
he argued that this type of accommodation was the exact type of
accommodation for which the FHAA was enacted.4"
Judge Calabresi did warn, however, that in these situations the
court needed to be certain that it was a disabled person's disability
that prevented him or her from earning an income and not some
other factor.5" He reasoned that if an applicant's financial circum-
stances would not be sufficient to meet rent requirements even if he
or she was not disabled, allowing this type of accommodation would
not accommodate for the disabled person's disability, but rather for
some alternative factor.5' Judge Calabresi determined that in that
type of situation, no discrimination against the disabled would
occur, and, as such, accommodations in those circumstances were
not included in the FHAA's definition of discrimination. 2
Judge Calabresi also disagreed with the majority's assertion that
the proposed accommodation would not be reasonable. Calabresi
stated that Stratford Greens had previously housed four tenants
45. See id. at 308 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
46. See id.
47. See id. at 309 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
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who had participated in the Section 8 program.53 Calabresi
reasoned that because Stratford Greens had already exposed itself
to the risks and burdens of accepting Section 8 tenants, it could not
argue that the addition of two new Section 8 tenants was unreason-
able as a matter of law.54 Judge Calabresi did not indicate, however,
whether requiring a landlord to participate in the Section 8
program would be unreasonable, as a matter of law, if the landlord
had not previously participated in the program.55
B. Giebeler v. M&B Associates
Another major case that dealt with reasonable accommodations
for the financial circumstances of the disabled is Giebeler v. M&B
Associates.6 John Giebeler had become disabled by contracting
AIDS. 7 As a result of his disability, Giebeler needed to leave his job
as a psychiatric technician, where he had earned approximately
$36,000 per year. 8 Giebeler had hoped to move to a one-bedroom
apartment at the Park Branham Apartments (Branham) in San
Jose, California. 9 The rent for Giebeler's desired apartment was
53. See id. at 311 (Calabresi, J., dissenting). None of these four tenants had participated
in the Section 8 program at the time Stratford Greens offered them an apartment. Rather,
they had all become Section 8 participants while they were tenants at Stratford Greens.
Salute v. Stratford Greens, 918 F. Supp. 660,662 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir.
1998).
54. Salute, 136 F.3d at 311 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
55. This Note does not attempt to resolve whether the proposed accommodations in
Salute were reasonable. Rather, it determines that the proposed accommodations in Salute
were not accommodations within the meaning of the FHAA. As such, determining whether
the proposed accommodations were reasonable is unnecessary and the subject is not
discussed further.
56. 343 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2003).
57. Id. at 1144. The United States Supreme Court has determined that having HIV/AIDS
is a disability. See Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1998) (holding that having HIV
is a disability within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act). The legislative
history of the FHAA also states that the Act would end discrimination, in housing contexts,
against people with AIDS. See H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,2179 ("People with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and
people who test positive for the AIDS virus have been evicted because of an erroneous belief
that they pose a health risk to others.").
58. Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1145.
59. Id.
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$875 per month.6" Giebeler also had hoped to move to Branham,
because it "was closer to his mother's home" than his current
apartment.61 The management at Branham rejected Giebeler's
application because his income of approximately $1,137 to $1,237
per month62 did not meet Branham's minimum income requirement,
which was an income of at least three times an apartment's rent per
month.63 Although Giebeler did not meet Branham's minimum
income requirement at the time he applied for an apartment, he
would have met Branham's minimum income requirement if he had
retained his previous job as a psychiatric technician. 64
After Branham's original rejection, both Giebeler and his mother
applied for an apartment at Branham.65 Giebeler's mother had no
negative credit rating entries and received an income in excess of
the $2,625 per month that Branham required to rent the apartment
that her son wanted. 6 Again, the management at Branham rejected
their applications, stating that it "considered [Giebeler's mother] a
cosigner and [that it had] a policy against allowing cosigners on
lease agreements."67 After this second rejection, Giebeler filed suit
against the owners of Branham, alleging violations of the FHAA for
failing to make reasonable accommodations.6"
Unlike Salute, the Ninth Circuit decided that Giebeler's request
was a reasonable accommodation within the meaning of the
FHAA.69 The court determined that these types of accommodations
were necessary to "'protect the right of handicapped persons to live
in the residence of their choice in the community,' and 'to end
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Giebeler received $837 per month from the Social Security Disability Insurance
program and $300 to $400 per month as a subsidy from the Housing Opportunities for People
with AIDS program. See id. Giebeler's mother also provided him with varied amounts of
support. See id.
63. Id. "For the apartment that Giebeler wished to rent, the minimum required income
was $2,625 per month." Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1146. Giebeler also filed suit for violations of various state statutes. Id.
69. See id. at 1159.
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the unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the
American mainstream."70
After the court stated that accommodations for financial circum-
stances were necessary for the disabled to obtain housing "of their
choice,"7' it then heavily relied on a recent Supreme Court decision,
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,'2 to support its position that this type
of policy modification was a reasonable accommodation within the
meaning of the FHAA. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
allowing Giebeler to have his mother rent an apartment on his
behalf was a reasonable accommodation under the FHAA because,
in Barnett, the Court had stated that "an accommodation may
indeed result in a preference for disabled individuals over otherwise
similarly situated nondisabled individuals."73 In Giebeler's situa-
tion, the Ninth Circuit believed that this statement meant that
providing Giebeler with the advantage of being able to utilize a
cosigner, when nondisabled tenants could not, did not present a
problem.
The Ninth Circuit also asserted that in Barnett the Supreme
Court had indicated that a reasonable accommodation need not
alleviate the physical or mental effects of a person's disability.74 As
such, all the Ninth Circuit needed to find to decide that Giebeler's
request was a reasonable accommodation, within the meaning of
the FHAA, was that the accommodation was both reasonable and
necessary. The Giebeler court found the accommodation necessary,
because without it Giebeler would not have had an "equal opportu-
nity to use and enjoy a dwelling at Branham."7 '5 The court then
70. Id. at 1149 (emphasis added) (quoting City of Edmonds v. Wash. State Bldg. Code
Council, 18 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotations omitted).
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. 535 U.S. 391 (2002). Barnett involved a reasonable accommodation claim under the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, not the FHAA. The Court's analysis of reasonable
accommodations within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act, however, is still
relevant to situations involving the FHAA, as "[tihe requirements for reasonable
accommodation under the [Americans with Disabilities Act] are the same as those under the
FHAA." Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775,783 (7th
Cir. 2002).
73. Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1150.
74. Id. at 1150-51.
75. Id. at 1156 (emphasis added).
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found the accommodation to be reasonable, because, if imple-
mented, Branham would not have incurred "any substantial
financial or administrative risk or burden" and because, in the past,
Branham had occasionally allowed cosigners.76 The Giebeler court,
having found that this type of accommodation was within the
FHAA's meaning of reasonable accommodation, concluded that
Branham was required to permit Giebeler's mother to rent an
apartment for him.77
The Giebeler court also distinguished its decision from Salute. It
first argued that "Salute ... [was] decided before Barnett, and [its]
reasoning cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's analysis
in that case."78 Second, the Giebeler court appears to have main-
tained that the type of accommodation requested in Salute was
unreasonable, whereas the accommodation requested in Giebeler
was not. 9 It is strange that the Giebeler court made this argument,
as it stated later in its opinion that an ordinarily unreasonable
accommodation could become reasonable if a similar accommoda-
tion had previously been made by a party. 0 Despite this inconsis-
tency, the Giebeler court used these two points to distinguish its
decision from that of the Second Circuit in Salute.
76. Id. at 1158. The Ninth Circuit supported its analysis by citing to Barnett. See id. The
Court in Barnett had alluded that an otherwise unreasonable accommodation might become
reasonable if the accommodating party had made the same accommodation in the past. See
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405 ("The plaintiff ... nonetheless remains free to show that special
circumstances warrant a finding that ... the requested 'accommodation' is 'reasonable' on the
particular facts.... The plaintiff might show [for example] that the system already contains
exceptions such that, in the circumstances, one further exception is unlikely to matter.").
77. Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1159.
78. Id. at 1154.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 1158. Stratford Greens had previously allowed four Section 8 tenants at the
apartment complex. See Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 311
(2d Cir. 1998) (Calabresi, J., dissenting). Under the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Giebeler,
which echoed Judge Calabresi's dissent in Salute, one could conclude that Salute and
Kravette's requested accommodations were, in fact, reasonable.
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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
III. THE GIEBELER COURT'S RELIANCE ON BARNETT IS MISPLACED
In Giebeler, the court heavily relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Barnett. Specifically, the Giebeler court stated that
Barnett supported the proposition that the FHAA allows the
disabled to be preferred over the nondisabled, and that reasonable
accommodations "are not limited only to lowering barriers created
by the disability itself."81 The Giebeler court's reliance on these
propositions is misplaced, however, as the Court's decision in
Barnett does not support these assertions.
"Robert Barnett ... [had] injured his back while working in a
cargo-handling position at ... US Airways, Inc." 2 As a result of this
injury, Barnett temporarily transferred to a position in the
mailroom at US Airways." The US Airways seniority system,
however, allowed senior employees to take the position that Barnett
occupied in the mailroom from him.' Barnett requested that US
Airways accommodate his disability by making an exception to its
seniority policy and allowing him to stay in the mailroom.85 US
Airways refused to authorize the accommodation and Barnett lost
his job in the mailroom.86 Barnett then sued US Airways, claiming
that it had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 by
failing to reasonably accommodate his disability.87 In deciding the
case, the Supreme Court determined that, although in the majority
of situations an accommodation that requires the alteration of a
seniority system would not be reasonable, it would remand the case
to determine if any "special circumstances" existed that made this
specific accommodation a reasonable one.88
81. Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1154.
82. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002). Barnett's injury was a
disability within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 403, 405.
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A. Barnett Allows Preferences Only to the Extent That They Place
the Disabled on Equal Footing with the Nondisabled
The Giebeler ruling suggested that Barnett supports the proposi-
tion that the FHAA permits the disabled to be preferred over the
nondisabled. Upon examination, however, one finds that the Court
in Barnett stated exactly the opposite.
Barnett did state that when a disabled person receives a reason-
able accommodation under the FHAA, he or she receives some sort
of preference over another. Indeed, by definition, when one receives
an accommodation, he or she is treated differently than others,
implicitly necessitating some sort of preferential treatment."9 For
example, suppose that a blind individual, who needs to use a
seeing-eye dog, lives in an apartment complex with a strict no pets
policy. Allowing that individual to have a seeing-eye dog live in his
or her apartment is a reasonable accommodation to that person's
disability."0 Implicitly, that disabled individual is given a preference
over the other residents of the complex, because management
allows that person to keep a dog at his or her apartment and does
not allow other nondisabled tenants to do the same. This prefer-
ence, however, does not allow the apartment complex to generally
favor that disabled person. Rather, the preference for that disabled
person is allowed only to the extent that he or she is treated as an
equal to the nondisabled residents. Thus, the FHAA allows the
disabled to be placed on an equal plane with the nondisabled, not
a greater plane.
The Supreme Court, in Barnett, supported the position that the
FHAA requires only that the disabled be treated equally, not
preferentially, in comparison with the nondisabled. This view was
demonstrated when, in Barnett, the Court stated that "preferences
will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the [FHAA's] basic equal
opportunity goal." " The Supreme Court recognized, therefore, that
preferences are only necessary to the extent that the disabled are
89. Id. at 397.
90. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b) (2004).
91. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397 (emphasis added).
20041 801GIMME SHELTER
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
treated as equals with the nondisabled. Also, by stating that the
FHAA has an equal opportunity goal, the Court recognized that the
disabled are required to have equal, not preferential, opportunities.
For example, if the hypothetical blind person mentioned earlier
wished to have a dog as a pet that was not a seeing-eye dog, the
apartment complex would not, under the FHAA, be required to
extend that privilege to the disabled person.92
Giebeler appears to suggest that the Supreme Court supported
the proposition that the disabled need to receive general prefer-
ences over the nondisabled. An example of such a general prefer-
ence would be permitting a blind individual to keep a non-seeing-
eye dog in an apartment complex with a no pets policy. Such an
accommodation would not make it any easier for a blind individual
to use or enjoy his or her residence-a step necessary to place the
blind individual on an equal plane with the nondisabled-but,
rather, the accommodation would simply permit the blind tenant to
receive a luxury that management prohibited other tenants from
receiving. In other words, Giebeler essentially argued that Barnett
suggested that a disabled person must be given a greater opportu-
nity to use and enjoy a dwelling than those without disabilities.93 It
appears, therefore, that under the court's reasoning in Giebeler, a
disabled individual at Branham, who does not need to have his or
her rent paid for by a third party, should still be allowed to have his
or her rent paid by a third party, even though such a measure is
unnecessary and a nondisabled person does not have the same
privilege.94 Such an accommodation would be virtually the same as
allowing a blind tenant to keep a non-seeing-eye dog in a no pets
92. See Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that it is not within the
meaning of reasonable accommodation under the FHAA to allow a deaf person to have a dog
in an apartment with a no pets policy unless the dog is a hearing dog).
93. See, e.g., Giebeler v. M&B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[Uinder
Barnett, ... the accommodation [Giebeler] seeks might still qualify as an accommodation
under the FHAA, as long as adjusting Branham's method ofjudging financial responsibility
would aid him in obtaining an apartment he could otherwise not inhabit because of his
disability.").
94. See Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1150 ("Barnett holds that an accommodation may indeed
result in a preference for disabled individuals over otherwise similarly situated nondisabled
individuals.").
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policy apartment complex. In both situations, the management at
the complex would allow the disabled tenant to receive a luxury
that other nondisabled tenants are not allowed to receive. In
addition, in both situations the accommodations would do nothing
to aid the disabled individuals' abilities to have equal opportunities
to use and enjoy the dwellings as compared to those without
disabilities. Instead, the disabled individuals would actually have
greater opportunities to use and enjoy dwellings than nondisabled
individuals living at the same complexes.
These types of preferences and accommodations are not what the
Supreme Court intended. In Barnett, the Court specifically stated
that a disabled person should be given preferences only so that he
or she has an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.95
Implicit in this statement is the proposition that the disabled are
not entitled to a greater opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling,
which is the opposite of what the Giebeler court infers. For this
reason, the Giebeler court's reliance on Barnett is improper.
B. Barnett Supports the Idea That Accommodations Under the
FHAA Need to Accommodate One's Disability
The Giebeler court believed that Barnett "held that accommoda-
tion requirements ... are not limited only to lowering barriers
created by the disability itself."96 The Giebeler court further stated
that "Barnett indicates, inferentially if not expressly, that a
required accommodation need not address 'barriers that would not
be barriers but for the [individual's] disability."' The Giebeler court
further supported the proposition that reasonable accommodations
need not alleviate the physical or mental effects of a disability by
arguing that the Supreme Court, in Barnett, stated that an
alteration to a seniority system could be required as a reasonable
accommodation within the meaning of the FHAA.9"
95. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397.
96. Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1154.
97. Id. at 1150 (quoting Barnett, 535 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
98. Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1151. An alteration to a seniority system does not directly
alleviate the physical or mental effects of a particular disability.
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When it argues that reasonable accommodations need not
directly alleviate the physical or mental effects of a disability,
Giebeler ignores the substance of the Barnett decision. Contrary to
what the court stated in Giebeler, Barnett affirms that reasonable
accommodations must alleviate the direct physical or mental effects
of a disability, and are not intended to accommodate the byproducts
of those disabilities. In fact, Barnett stated that considerations of
the possible byproducts of an accommodation, such as a change to
a seniority system or requiring an apartment complex to accept a
Section 8 voucher, should only be examined in regards to whether
the proposed accommodation is reasonable, and not whether the
byproducts are accommodations in and of themselves.
In Barnett, the proposed accommodation was not to US Airways's
seniority system. Rather, the proposed accommodation was to allow
a disabled employee to maintain a less physically demanding job.
Barnett had become unable to perform the duties of his job as a
cargo-handler.99 By relieving him of the physical stress that he
experienced in that job, the proposed accommodation would have
alleviated the direct physical effects of his disability. That US
Airways would need to alter its seniority system to accomplish this
accommodation was simply a byproduct. Consideration of the effects
of this byproduct needed to be taken into consideration only to
determine ifBarnett's proposed accommodation was reasonable, not
to determine if the request was an accommodation in and of itself.
Examining the text of Barnett reveals that the Court supported
the proposition that a reasonable accommodation, within the
meaning of the FHAA, needs to accommodate the direct physical or
mental effects of a disability and that necessary changes to systems
or regulations, as a result of a proposed accommodation, are to be
examined only to determine if that proposed accommodation is
reasonable. The Court framed the issue of Barnett's proposed
accommodation by stating that Barnett "has requested assignment
to a mailroom position as a 'reasonable accommodation." 00 This
statement is significant. The Court takes the position that the
99. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394.
100. Id. at 402-03.
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proposed accommodation is Barnett's transfer to the mailroom, not
the alternation to US Airways's seniority system. As was stated
previously, a reassignment to the mailroom would have alleviated
the physical effects of Barnett's disability. 1 This reassignment is
precisely the type of accommodation the FHAA envisions. The Court
did not frame the issue as an accommodation to the seniority
system at US Airways because such an accommodation would not
have alleviated any physical or mental effects of Barnett's disability
and, therefore, would not be required under the FHAA. From this
analysis, it appears that the Giebeler court's assertion that Barnett
implies that an accommodation need not directly deal with the
effects of one's disability is misplaced.0 2 Furthermore, the Court's
analysis in Barnett demonstrates that Judge Calabresi's suggestion,
in Salute, that a reasonable accommodation need not alleviate the
direct physical or mental effects of one's disability, was erroneous
as well.' 3
Barnett likewise supports the assertion that the byproducts of a
proposed accommodation should be examined only to determine if
the proposed accommodation is reasonable. Evidence of this is that
the Court examined the potential change to US Airways's seniority
system only in regards to whether the accommodation of allowing
Barnett to take a less physically demanding job would be reason-
able. °4 Specifically, the Court stated:
The question in the present case focuses on the relationship
between seniority systems and [Barnett's] need to show that an
"accommodation" seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or
in the run of cases. We must assume that [Barnett], an em-
ployee, is an "individual with a disability." He has requested
101. See supra text accompanying note 100.
102. For a contrary view, see PollyW. Blakemore, Note, Short of Money or Shortchanged?:
Reasonable Accommodations in Rental Rules and Policies for Disabled Individuals Receiving
Financial Assistance, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 449, 459-70 (2000) (arguing that a disabled person
should not need to show a causal nexus between his or her disability and a proposed
accommodation).
103. See supra text accompanying note 45; see also Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden
Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 307-13 (2d Cir. 1998) (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
104. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403.
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assignment to a mailroom position as a "reasonable accommoda-
tion." We also assume that normally such a request would be
reasonable within the meaning of the statute, were it not for one
circumstance, namely, that the assignment would violate the
rules of a seniority system.10 5
From this passage it is clear that the Court did not consider the
potential change to the seniority system as part of the accommo-
dation itself, but rather examined the change solely to determine
whether the proposed accommodation was reasonable. This con-
struction is strong evidence that rejects the Giebeler court's
assertion that Barnett implied that an accommodation need not
directly alleviate the physical or mental effect of one's disability.
Rather, Barnett in fact implied that an accommodation must
alleviate a direct physical or mental effect of a disability. The
changes necessary to implement this accommodation must then be
examined to determine if the accommodation is reasonable. These
changes, however, are not considered part of the accommodation
itself.
The implications of this analysis concerning proposed accommo-
dations for the financial circumstances of the disabled are clear. A
change to a landlord's rules, such as amending a rule prohibiting
the use of Section 8 vouchers or payments by third parties, does not
alleviate any of the physical or mental effects of a person's disabil-
ity. According to the Supreme Court's analysis in Barnett, therefore,
changes to rules such as these should only be examined to deter-
mine the reasonableness of other proposed accommodations. They
should not be considered as accommodations themselves.
In Salute, the only request that either Salute or Kravette made
was that Stratford Greens allow them to use Section 8 vouchers to
pay portions of their rent. °6 Similarly, Giebeler's only request was
that Branham allow his mother to rent an apartment for him. °7 In
neither situation did any of the potential tenants make any request
that would have alleviated the direct physical or mental effects of
105. Id. at 402-03.
106. See Salute, 136 F.3d at 299-302.
107. See Giebeler v. M&B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 2003).
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their disabilities. As was stated above, under Barnett, courts should
consider changes to rules or policies, such as those at issue in
Salute and Giebeler, only to determine the reasonableness of an
accommodation that does alleviate the physical or mental effects of
a disability. Given that no accommodations alleviating the physical
or mental effects of disabilities were requested in either Salute or
Giebeler, it would be improper to consider the requests made in
these two cases as reasonable accommodations within the meaning
of the FHAA.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS
A. The Legislative History of the FHAA
The legislative history of the FHAA further suggests that
modifying policies to accommodate the financial circumstances
of the disabled is not within the FHAA's meaning of reasonable
accommodations. Admittedly, the legislative history of the FHAA
is scarce.' By investigating the examples of reasonable accommo-
dations that the House of Representatives provided in the FHAA's
legislative history, however, it becomes clear that Congress did not
intend to include accommodations for the financial circumstances
of the disabled within the meaning of reasonable accommodations.
Prior to the enactment of the FHAA, the House Report on the Act
presented various examples of situations that constituted reason-
able accommodations within the meaning of the FHAA. For
example, the report stated that reasonable accommodations include
installing shower grab bars, installing flashing "doorbells" for
individuals with hearing impairments, installing lever doorknobs
for individuals with severe arthritis, and installing ramps and fold-
back hinging doors for individuals in wheelchairs.0 9 All of these
examples present modifications that alleviate a direct physical
effect of a disabled person's disability. The installation of shower
108. See id. at 1148 ("[The FHAA's legislative history and regulations provide us with
little specific guidance as to the scope and limitations of'accommodation' under the FHAA.").
109. See H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 18, 25 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2179, 2186.
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grab bars alleviates the physical effects of certain peoples' disabili-
ties by "provid[ing] more stability and help[ing] prevent slips and
falls.""' A flashing doorbell aids in alleviating a hearing-impaired
individual's inability to hear a doorbell. A lever doorknob allows
people who have arthritis to open doors comfortably, which often is
not possible with conventional doorknobs.' The installation of a
ramp provides people who need to use wheelchairs with access to
buildings to which they previously could not gain entrance. Finally,
the installation of fold-back hinges on doors gives people who need
to use wheelchairs the ability to traverse through doors when they
previously could not."2 None of these examples of reasonable
accommodations alleviate a nonphysical byproduct of a person's
disability, such as a person's financial circumstances.
It can be inferred that, because the House Report provided
examples of accommodations that alleviate only the physical effects
of disabilities, Congress did not intend for the term "reasonable
accommodations" to extend to accommodations for a disabled
person's financial condition, even if that condition is a direct
byproduct of that person's disability. A plausible argument might
be made, however, that Congress simply never considered situa-
tions like those in Salute and Giebeler before it enacted the FHAA.
Assuming this is true, one might argue that if Congress had
considered situations like Salute and Giebeler, it would have
specifically provided that reasonable accommodations include
accommodations for a disabled person's financial circumstances, as
long as those circumstances are a direct result of that person's
disability. Upon further examination, however, it becomes clear
that this view is erroneous.
Assuming, arguendo, that Congress did not contemplate situa-
tions such as those in Salute and Giebeler before it enacted the
110. DIVISION OF AGING AND SENIORS, HEALTH CANADA, THE SAFE LIVING GUIDE: A GUIDE
TO HOME SAFETY FOR SENIORS 21 (1997), available at http:J/www.hc-sc.gc.ca/seniors-
aines/pubssafelivepdf/ safelive-e.pdf.
111. AARP, DOORS AND DOORWAY MODIFICATION DEVICES: LEVER HANDLES, at
http'//www.aarp.org/life/homedesigns/Articles/a2004-03-23-whatis univdesign.html (last
visited May 28, 2004).
112. H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 25, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.CA.N. at 2186.
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FHAA, it is still unlikely that, if it had, it would have deemed
accommodations for financial circumstances to be within the Act's
definition of reasonable accommodations. The Second Circuit
decided Salute over six years ago. 113 Congress has failed to react to
the decision by clarifying that the FHAA's definition of reasonable
accommodations does in fact encompass accommodations for
financial circumstances. Congressional silence, although by no
means determinative," 4 does suggest that Congress agrees with the
Second Circuit's determination that reasonable accommodations
do not include accommodations for a person's economic situation,
even if the person's disability directly causes that situation."'
In addition, it is unlikely that Congress would have agreed that
the FHAA provides accommodations for financial circumstances,
because requiring these types of accommodations would not further
the purpose of the FHAA, as discussed below.
B. Accommodations for Financial Circumstances Do Not Further
the Purpose of the FHAA
Congress enacted the FHAA in an attempt to end discrimination
against the disabled in housing contexts. Congress believed that
enacting the FHAA was "a major step in changing the stereotypes
that have served to exclude [the disabled] from American life. These
persons have been denied housing because of misperceptions,
ignorance, and outright prejudice.""' The legislative history further
113. See Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998).
114. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177,192 n.69 (1993)
("Congressional silence is, of course, ambiguous.").
115. A variety of court decisions, including a number of United States Supreme Court
decisions, have relied upon congressional silence to infer that Congress supports the current
state of the law. See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (stating that
congressional silence supported the proposition that Congress did not intend a higher
evidentiary standard); S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48,
56 n. 19 (1985) (recognizing that the Court had previously used congressional silence to decide
issues in at least one of its previous decisions); see also John C. Grabow, Congressional
Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture Into "Speculative Unrealities," 64
B.U. L. REV. 737, 740 (1984) (stating that congressional silence is an aid "upon which the
courts have increasingly relied in the search for legislative intent").
116. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 18, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179.
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states that the FHAA "repudiates the use of stereotypes and
ignorance, and mandates that persons with handicaps be consid-
ered as individuals. Generalized perceptions about disabilities and
unfounded speculations about threats to safety are specifically
rejected as grounds to justify exclusion." 7 In its report, the House
of Representatives also illustrated the exact type of discrimination
the FHAA sought to end. It stated:
People with visual and hearing impairments have been per-
ceived as dangers because of erroneous beliefs about their
abilities. People with mental retardation have been excluded
because of stereotypes about their capacity to live safely and
independently. People with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) and people who test positive for the AIDS
virus have been evicted because of an erroneous belief that they
pose a health risk to others."'
From these findings, there can be no doubt that Congress's intent
when it enacted the FHAA was to end discrimination and the
further spread of stereotypes against the disabled in housing
contexts.
Accommodations for the financial circumstances of a disabled
person, even if those circumstances are directly caused by that
person's disability, in no way hinder the furtherance of stereotypes
or discrimination against the disabled. In both Salute and Giebeler,
management at the respective apartment complexes did not refuse
the potential tenants' applications because of their disabilities, but
rather because they lacked sufficient income." 9 If any of the
potential tenants had met the income requirements of the respec-
tive apartment complexes, management would have granted them
117. Id.
118. Id. (footnotes omitted).
119. See Giebeler v. M&B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Branham ...
informed Giebeler that he did not qualify for tenancy at Branham because he did not meet
the minimum income requirements.") (emphasis added); Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden
Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 296, 302 (1998) ("What stands between these plaintiffs and the
apartments at Stratford Greens is a shortage of money, and nothing else.") (emphasis added).
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an apartment. 2 ° Because the tenants were not rejected on the basis
of their respective disabilities, it does not further stereotypes and
prejudice toward the disabled not to require the types of accommo-
dations requested in Salute and Giebeler. In Salute and Giebeler the
landlords would have accepted tenants with AIDS, chronic asthma,
dextroscoliosis of the back, diverticulitis, ulcerative colitis, depres-
sion, or rheumatoid arthritis, as long as they still met the income
requirements of the apartment. Requiring accommodations for
financial circumstances, therefore, does not stop the furtherance of
stereotypes or prejudice against the disabled, because manage-
ment's denial of a potential tenant has nothing to do with that
person's disability. The purpose of the FHAA, therefore, is not
furthered by allowing accommodations for financial circumstances.
It is true, however, that discrimination, within the meaning of
the FHAA, need not be overt. Congress recognized when it enacted
the FHAA that
housing discrimination against handicapped persons is not
limited to blatant, intentional acts of discrimination. Acts that
have the effect of causing discrimination can bejust as devastat-
ing as intentional discrimination. A person using a wheelchair
is just as effectively excluded from the opportunity to live in a
particular dwelling by the lack of access into a unit and by too
narrow doorways as by a posted sign saying "No Handicapped
People Allowed." ... [Tihe Supreme Court [has) observed that
discrimination on the basis of handicap is "most often the
product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness
and indifference-of benign neglect" and mentioned "architec-
tural barriers" as one factor that can have a discriminatory
effect. 2'
It could be argued that not requiring accommodations for a disabled
person's financial circumstances constitutes discrimination because
it disproportionately affects the disabled population. The argument
in support of this contention would be that, because the disabled, on
120. See Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1145; Salute, 136 F.3d at 302.
121. H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 25, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2186 (footnote
omitted).
20041 811
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
average, earn less than the nondisabled, they are effectively
discriminated against when accommodations for their financial
circumstances, which are a result of their disabilities, are not
required. According to this argument, by not requiring financial
accommodations, a disproportionate amount of the disabled are
affected, and they are thus effectively discriminated against.
Consequently, proponents of this view would argue that the FHAA
should require reasonable accommodations for the financial
circumstances of disabled persons if those circumstances are caused
by that person's disability.
This argument, however, contains two major flaws. First, the
income of the disabled, on the whole, does not dramatically differ
from that of other minority groups."' For example, in the United
States, in 1997, only 10.4% of non-severely disabled individuals,
ages twenty-five to sixty-four, lived below the poverty line.'23
This percentage is lower than the 1997 U.S. poverty levels of
African Americans, Hispanics, Asian Americans, and non-Hispanic
Whites. 2 4 Furthermore, the 1997 U.S. poverty rate for severely
disabled individuals, ages twenty-five to sixty-four, was 27.9%.125
That poverty level was not considerably different from the 1997
U.S. poverty levels of African Americans and Hispanics, which were
26.5% and 27.1% respectively.'26 The differences in income between
the disabled, especially those who are not severely disabled, and
other minority groups, such as Hispanics and African Americans,
122. Compare JACK MCNEIL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES:
HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES 14-15 (2001) (stating 1997 median earnings for people with
disabilities as well as poverty levels for people with severe and non-severe disabilities in
1997), available at httpJ/www.sipp.census.gov/sipp/p70s/p7-73.pdf, with Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Number of African Americans in Poverty Declines While Income Rises,
Census Bureau Reports (Sept. 24, 1998) (stating poverty rates and median incomes for
African Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanic, and White households in the United States
in 1997), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Releasecb98-176.html, and Dr. Daniel H.
Weinberg, Press Briefing on 1997 Income and Poverty Estimates (Sept. 24,1998) (stating the
1997 poverty rates for African Americans, Hispanics, and non-Hispanic Whites), available
at http://www.census.gov/hhesincome/income97/prs98asc.html.
123. See MCNEIL, supra note 122, at 14.
124. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, supra note 122; Weinberg, supra note 122.
125. See MCNEIL, supra note 122, at 14.
126. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, supra note 122; Weinberg, supra note 122.
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are slight. As such, the argument that accommodations for the
financial circumstances of the disabled are necessary to prevent
effective discrimination fails.'27 Requiring accommodations for the
financial circumstances of the disabled does not alleviate any type
of discrimination toward the disabled. The purpose of the FHAA,
therefore, is not furthered by making such accommodations
mandatory.
The second flaw in the argument that not requiring financial
accommodations effectively discriminates against the disabled is
that failing to require these types of accommodations does not cause
discrimination against every member of a particular class. The
legislative history of the FHAA provides, as an example of effective
discrimination, a situation in which a wheelchair user is discrimi-
nated against because of a building's structure.'28 This type of
discrimination would effectively discriminate against all people who
have a disability requiring them to use a wheelchair. For example,
imagine an apartment complex that begins on the fourth story of a
building containing no elevator and in which it is not feasible to
install equipment making it possible for a person using a wheel-
chair to ascend the stairs. The physical constraints of this hypothet-
ical building effectively limit all people who need to use wheelchairs
from having an "equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 129
This same limiting effect is not present in any situation in which
accommodations for financial circumstances are not granted. Unlike
certain physical constraints for people who use wheelchairs,
financial requirements do not systematically eliminate all persons
127. In at least one case, racial minorities attempted to claim that income requirements,
such as those found in Giebeler, violate the Fair Housing Act because they have a
discriminatory effect against minorities. See Boyd v. Lefrak Org. & Life Realty, Inc., 509 F.2d
1110 (2d Cir. 1975). The allegations of discrimination were made on the grounds that, on
average, minorities earn less than non-minorities. See id. at 1112-13. The court ultimately
found that the income requirements did not violate the Fair Housing Act. See id. ("While
blacks and Puerto Ricans do not have the same access to Lefrak apartments as do whites,
the reason for this inequality is not racial discrimination but rather the disparity in economic
level among these groups.").
128. See H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 25 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2186
(stating that for a person in a wheelchair, a building containing narrow doorways is
equivalent to posting a sign stating "No Handicapped People Allowed").
129. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2003).
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with specific disabilities from having an equal opportunity to enjoy
a dwelling. Regardless of what the mandatory income requirement
for a specific dwelling might be, it never, by itself, eliminates all
people with a certain disability from obtaining an "equal opportu-
nity to use and enjoy a dwelling."3 ° Even if a certain disability
prevents every person with that disability from obtaining or
maintaining any type of employment, there is still a possibility,
however slim, that a person with that disability could meet the
income requirements of a specific dwelling. The disabled person
could meet the requirements by receiving income that he or she
earned before becoming disabled, from previous investments, from
inheritance, or from multiple other sources. As can be seen,
disabled people are never systematically excluded, as a class, from
enjoying the use of any apartment because the apartment has a
minimum income requirement. The question relevant for admit-
tance to the residence in these situations is not whether a person is
disabled but, rather, whether a person has sufficient funds to meet
rent requirements. The argument that not requiring accommoda-
tions for financial circumstances discriminates against the disabled,
therefore, fails. From this analysis, it should be determined that
requiring accommodations for the financial circumstances of the
disabled would not further the purpose of the FHAA, because it
would not assist in the prevention of discrimination or the further-
ing of stereotypes against the disabled.
130. See id.
814 [Vol. 46:787
GIMME SHELTER
V. REQUIRING ACCOMMODATIONS FOR THE FINANCIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DISABLED IS ALMOST NEVER "NECESSARY"
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FHAA
A. If Other Suitable Dwellings Are Available, Reasonable Accom-
modations Are Not "Necessary"
In order for an accommodation to be reasonable within the
meaning of the FHAA, the accommodation must be necessary.
131
Some recent cases, which have discussed the FHAA, have held that
an accommodation is necessary if, without it, a party would be
denied "an equal opportunity to enjoy the housing of their choice." 32
Yet this approach is not what is required by the FHAA. The FHAA
requires only that a person have an "equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling, " 133 not an opportunity to use and "enjoy the
housing of [his or her] choice."134 Because gaining admittance to a
residence is only truly necessary if one does not have an equal
opportunity to enjoy a similar suitable dwelling, an accommodation
is not necessary if other suitable housing is available. An accommo-
dation, therefore, need not make it possible for a party to obtain the
exact dwelling of his or her choice. Evidence of this is that allowing
a disabled person to move from his or her current dwelling to
another dwelling that meets his or her needs, even if that person
does not want to move to a new dwelling, is sometimes a sufficient
reasonable accommodation within the meaning of the FHAA.
131
Implicitly therefore, even if the situations in Salute and Giebeler
required financial accommodations to be made, the potential
131. See id. ("For purposes of this subsection, discrimination includes ... a refusal to make
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such
accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy
a dwelling.") (emphasis added).
132. See, e.g., Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 795 (6th Cir.
1996).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
134. Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc., 102 F.3d at 795 (emphasis added).
135. See, e.g., Congdon v. Strine, 854 F. Supp. 355,362-63 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (finding that a
landlord did not fail to make reasonable accommodations, because offering tenants a first-
floor apartment, as opposed to their current fourth-floor apartment, met the needs of the
disabled tenant).
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tenants would still not necessarily be entitled to the exact dwellings
of their choosing at Stratford Greens or Branham.
The case that best exemplifies the proposition that accommoda-
tions are not necessary if other suitable housing is available is
Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County.13 This case involved a
group home, named Bryant Woods Inn, which housed elderly
persons who suffered from various mental disabilities.'37 Richard
Colandrea, the owner of Bryant Woods Inn, wished to expand the
home's capacity from eight to fifteen residents.'3 The proposed
expansion, however, violated Howard County's zoning regula-
tions.' 9 In an attempt to accomplish the proposed expansion,
Colandrea applied for a zoning variance.'4 After a public hearing
on the matter, the Howard County Planning Board unanimously
denied his request.' After the Board denied Colandrea's motion
for reconsideration, he filed suit, "alleging that Howard County...
failed to make a reasonable accommodation for the handicapped in
violation of the Fair Housing Act."'42
When the Fourth Circuit heard the case, the key issue was
whether the proposed accommodation was "necessary" within the
meaning of the FHAA. The court found that:
The "necessary" element-the FHA provision mandating reason-
able accommodations which are necessary to afford an equal
opportunity-requires the demonstration of a direct linkage
between the proposed accommodation and the "equal opportu-
nity" to be provided to the handicapped person. This require-
ment has attributes of a causation requirement. And if the
proposed accommodation provides no direct amelioration of a
disability's effect, it cannot be said to be "necessary."43
136. 124 F.3d 597 (4th Cir. 1997).
137. Id. at 599.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 600.
142. Id. at 601.
143. Id. at 604.
816 [Vol. 46:787
In other words, the court found that to be a necessary accommoda-
tion, the disabled person must not already have an equal opportu-
nity to use and enjoy a dwelling. This equal opportunity could
include alternative housing options, other than the disabled
person's first choice of dwellings. In Bryant Woods Inn, the court
found that other housing, which provided similar services to those
provided at Bryant Woods Inn, was readily available in the area.
144
Because alternate housing was readily available for the seven new
potential residents of Bryant Woods Inn, the court found that the
proposed accommodation was not "necessary" within the meaning
of the FHAA. Specifically, the court stated:
A handicapped person desiring to live in a group home in a
residential community in Howard County can do so now at
Bryant Woods Inn under existing zoning regulations, and, if no
vacancy exists, can do so at the numerous other group homes at
which vacancies exist. The unrefuted evidence is that the
vacancy rate was between 18 to 23% within Howard County. We
hold that in these circumstances, Bryant Woods Inn's demand
that it be allowed to expand its facility from 8 to 15 residents is
not "necessary," as used in the [Fair Housing Act], to accommo-
date handicapped persons. 145
Under Bryant Woods Inn, therefore, if other suitable housing is
available to a disabled individual, no reasonable accommodations
are "necessary" within the meaning of the FHAA, and, as such, no
reasonable accommodations are required.
146
144. See id. at 605 ("The unrefuted evidence is that the vacancy rate [at homes similar to
Bryant Woods Inn] was between 18 to 23% within Howard County.").
145. Id.
146. Some courts have rejected the reasoning of Bryant Woods Inn and found reasonable
accommodations to be necessary even if other suitable housing is available. See, e.g., ReMed
Recovery Care Ctrs. v. Township of Willistown, 36 F. Supp. 2d 676,686 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ('This
court rejects the Bryant Woods approach under which the fact that other similar homes
operate without a variance for additional residents negates necessity, without any
consideration of the needs of a particular care-provider or of individuals' desire to reside in
aparticular group home."). Commentators have also criticized the Bryant Woods Inn decision
and its reasoning. See Robert L. Schonfeld, "Reasonable Accommodation" Under the Federal
Fair Housing Amendments Act, 25 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 413, 434-41 (1998) (arguing that the
court in Bryant Woods Inn decided the case incorrectly, because it adopted the view of the
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B. Implications for Accommodations to Financial Circumstances
Resulting from Disabilities
The implications of Bryant Woods Inn on proposed accommoda-
tions for financial circumstances are clear. If other suitable
dwellings are available where the owners accept the disabled
person's proposed form of payment, then the proposed accommoda-
tions should not be required because they are not necessary within
the meaning of the FHAA. In both Salute and Giebeler, the
potential tenants offered to pay the full market rent that the
respective apartment complexes required.'47 Salute and Kravette,
however, required the use of Section 8 vouchers in order to pay the
full market rent of their desired apartments,'48 whereas Giebeler
would have needed his mother to pay at least a portion of his rent
at Branham.'49 Under Bryant Woods Inn, if other suitable dwellings
that accepted Section 8 vouchers or payments by third parties were
available, the accommodations should not have been required,
because they were not necessary within the meaning of the FHAA.
housing provider, and not the view of the disabled person). This Note, however, contends that
the court's treatment of the issue in Bryant Woods Inn is correct because, as has been
previously shown, even in regards to reasonable accommodations within the meaning of the
FHAA, disabled persons are entitled only to the use and enjoyment of a dwelling and not the
use and enjoyment of a dwelling of their choice. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying
text.
147. See Giebeler v. M&B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[The full
rent-not a discounted amount-would be paid monthly."); Salute v. Stratford Greens
Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293,296 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[I1n the Section S program, the tenant
pays in rent an amount not exceeding 30% of the tenant's gross income, and the government
contracts with the private landlord to pay a subsidy equal to the remainder of the market
rent."). Implicit in all situations in which accommodations for the financial circumstances of
a disabled person are requested is that, in some way, the dwelling's full market rent is paid.
If the proposed accommodation does not require that the entire full market rent be paid, that
accommodation would almost assuredly not be "reasonable" within the meaning of the
FHAA, because it would require modifications to existing programs that would impose
substantial burdens on landlords. See Salute v. Stratford Greens, 918 F. Supp. 660, 667
(E.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998). Even in Giebeler, the court appeared to
implicitly recognize that such a request would not be reasonable. See Giebeler, 343 F.3d at
1159 ("We stress once more that Giebeler was in no way trying to avoid payment of the usual
rent for the apartment he wanted to live in ....").
148. See Salute, 136 F.3d at 296.
149. See Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1145.
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Despite Salute's claim "that he was not able to locate another
suitable apartment within the statutory period," 5 ' in almost all
situations, other suitable housing that accepts the disabled person's
proposed payment method will exist. Even assuming, therefore,
that accommodations for the financial circumstances of a disabled
person are reasonable accommodations within the meaning of the
FHAA, they would almost never be necessary.
For example, Salute and Kravette both wished to move to
available apartments at the Stratford Greens apartment complex
in Suffolk County, New York.' 5' On November 12, 2003, rent for
apartments at Stratford Greens varied between $1045 and $1680
per month.'52 As of October 16, 2003, dwellings at over 100 locations
in Suffolk County were actively seeking tenants who participated
in the Section 8 voucher program.'53 Of these locations, twenty had
one-bedroom apartments available for rent.'5 Among these twenty
locations, apartments with rents similar to those at Stratford
Greens were available.'55 From this data, it can be concluded that
if Salute or Kravette's situation were to arise presently, it would be
highly likely that another suitable dwelling in Suffolk County, New
York would be available. Salute and Kravette's proposed accommo-
dations, therefore, should not be required, because they were not
necessary within the meaning of the FHAA.
Similarly, in 1997, Giebeler attempted to rent a one-bedroom
apartment at Branham, in San Jose, California. 56 As ofJanuary 28,
2004, the rent for a one-bedroom apartment at Branham was
$995 per month. 5 7 As of that same date, numerous one-bedroom
150. Salute v. Stratford Greens, 888 F. Supp. 17, 18 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), summ. j. granted by
918 F. Supp. 660 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998).
151. See Salute, 136 F.3d at 296.
152. Apartments in Hauppauge, at http://www.123aptsearch.com/Long-Island.NY/
Hauppauge.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2003).
153. CMTY. DEV. CORP. OF LONG ISLAND, HOUSING RESOURCE LIST! (2003) (on file with
author).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., id. (stating that a one-bedroom apartment, with a monthly rent of $1,150,
was available at 385 Montauk Highway).
156. See Giebeler v. M&B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003).
157. See ABL Properties, at httpJ/www.ablmgtproperties.com/properties/detail.asp?ID=5
(last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
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apartments, in that same price range, were available in San Jose. 158
Some of these apartments permitted cosigners.'59 After examining
these facts, it is clear that Giebeler more than likely could have
found another suitable apartment, similar to Branham, that would
have accepted his mother's payments. Under Bryant Woods Inn,
therefore, Giebeler's proposed accommodation was not "necessary
to afford [him an] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 6 °
A hypothetical situation may assist in comprehending that
financial accommodations are not necessary to provide a disabled
person with the "equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling."' 61
Suppose that, just as in Giebeler, there is an individual with AIDS
whose application to an apartment complex was denied because of
insufficient income. 162 Also suppose that, just as in Giebeler, as a
result of her contraction of AIDS, the potential tenant has had to
leave her previous job and can no longer work.'6 3 In addition,
assume, like in Giebeler, that before the potential tenant left her
previous job, she had earned income sufficient to meet the mini-
mum income requirements for the apartment from which she had
been denied.' This hypothetical person, again as in Giebeler, has
a mother who meets the income requirements of the desired
apartment and was willing to pay for her daughter's rent. 6 5 Next
suppose, as in Giebeler, that this apartment complex still refused
to accept the potential tenant, because it considered the person's
mother to be a cosigner and the apartment complex has a strict no
158. See, e.g., Avalon Fairway Glen, available at httpJ/custom.springatreet.com/custom/
property/printable.jhtml?pid=145122 (last visited Jan. 28, 2004) (representing that the
monthly rent for a one-bedroom apartment at Fairway Glen begins at $950 per month); San
Jose Apartments, available at http://sanjoseca.areaguides.net/apartments.html?city=San+
Jose&st=CA&bed =1&mnp=900&mxp=1000&pet=0%7CO&bath =0&x=44&y=10 (lastvisited
Jan. 28, 2004).
159. E.g., Telephone Interview with Pari Jabbari, Assistant Community Manager,
Fairway Glen Apartments (Nov. 20, 2003) (stating that Fairway Glen, an apartment complex
in San Jose, California, permits its tenants to use cosigners).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2003).
161. Id.
162. See Giebeler v. M&B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003).
163. See id. at 1144.
164. Id. at 1145.
165. See id.
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cosigner policy. 6' Now assume that directly adjacent to this
hypothetical apartment complex is an identical apartment complex.
In fact, this apartment complex is identical to its neighbor in almost
every way except for two. The first difference is that the second
complex allows third parties to pay its tenants' rents. The second
difference is that the second complex allows its tenants to use
cosigners.
In this situation, it is difficult to argue that an accommodation
for the hypothetical person's economic situation is necessary to
provide that person with an "equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
dwelling."6 7 It is true that small differences, such as different
neighbors and slightly different views, would still exist between the
two apartments. These differences, however, are negligible, as they
would exist within a single apartment complex and, as was shown
above, a disabled person is not entitled to the exact unit of his or
her choice. 6 ' As such, the hypothetical person would have an "equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling" without requiring any sort
of accommodation. 1
69
Circumstances exactly like those posed in the hypothetical are
rare. In almost every situation, however, suitable, similar dwellings
will be available that already permit the type of financial accommo-
dation that the disabled person seeks. 70 As a result of this analysis,
it can safely be concluded that, even if accommodations for financial
situations were considered reasonable accommodations within the
meaning of the FHAA, these types of accommodations would almost
never be required, as they would rarely be "necessary" within the
meaning of the FHAA.
CONCLUSION
A debate currently exists as to whether the FHAA requires that
landlords accommodate for the financial circumstances of a disabled
166. See id.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2003).
168. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
169. 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(3XB).
170. See supra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
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person, if those circumstances are caused by that person's disabil-
ity. Two cases have come to differing conclusions on this issue. In
Salute, the Second Circuit determined that an apartment complex
did not need to accept Section 8 vouchers from two individuals who
needed to use the vouchers because of their disabilities.'71 In
Giebeler, however, the Ninth Circuit decided that an apartment
complex must permit a disabled potential tenant, who does not
meet the minimum income requirement for his desired apartment,
to pay for an apartment by having his mother, who does meet the
income requirement, rent the apartment for him.' 72 In Giebeler, the
court placed a great deal of emphasis on the Supreme Court's
decision in Barnett, a case involving a disabled employee who
sought a reasonable accommodation at US Airways.1 73
Courts should determine that the FHAA does not require
accommodations for the financial circumstances of the disabled,
even when a person's disability is the cause of those circumstances.
Three principal reasons exist as to why these proposed accommoda-
tions are not "reasonable accommodations." First, the reliance of the
Giebeler court on Barnett was misplaced, because Barnett did not
suggest that the FHAA allows preferences of the disabled or that
accommodations need not affect the direct mental or physical effects
of a person's disability.' 74 Second, these types of accommodations do
not reflect congressional intent. The legislative history of the FHAA
does not suggest that these types of accommodations are required,
and these types of accommodations do not further the congressional
purpose of the FHAA.' 75 Third, a reasonable accommodation, within
the meaning of the FHAA, must be necessary, and an accommoda-
171. See supra Part II.A.1.
172. See supra Part II.B.
173. See, e.g., Giebeler v. M&B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Barnett
guides our analysis concerning the reach of the accommodation obligation under the
FHAA.").
174. See supra Part III. In addition, the analysis of Barnett persuasively suggests that
Judge Calabresi's argument in Salute, that an accommodation need not alleviate the direct
physical or mental affects of a disability, is incorrect. See supra note 103 and accompanying
text; see also Salute v. Stratford Green, Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 307-13 (2d Cir.
1998) (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
175. See supra Part IV.
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tion for the financial circumstances of a disabled person will almost
never be necessary to provide an "equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling."'76 It is for these reasons that courts should find
that accommodations for the financial circumstances of a disabled
person, even when those circumstances are caused by that person's
disability, are not reasonable accommodations within the meaning
of the FHAA.
Brian R. Rosenau*
176. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2003) ("For the purposes of this subsection, discrimination
includes ... a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or
services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.") (emphasis added); see supra Part V.
* The author would like to thank Joe Schouten for his comments and critiques of this
Note.
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